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The Environment for Research 
In 1970 the Chief Justice of the Alaska State Supreme Court 
sought to adjust the state justice process to the needs of 
village Alaska1 through a process of team research by a lawyer 
and an anthropologist which he hoped would lead to an agenda for 
reform. Justice Boney spoke of reforms which acknowledged the 
local village role in the legal process. He influenced the 
conclusions of Alaska's first Bush Justice Conference that "the 
locus of decision making in the administration of justice in 
village Alaska must move closer to the village," and its calls 
for "greater Native participation at all levels of the adminis­
tration of justice" (Alaska Judicial Council, Bush Justice 
Conference, 1970:2). 
The conference stated that "strengthening of village councils 
is central to the administration of justice in remote Alaska" 
( Id: 2). 
Professional justice was also to be improved. Trials were to 
be held in more rural locations, police and judicial travel 
budgets were to be increased, and education and recruitment of 
Natives in each justice bureaucracy was to be accomplished. 
It suggested that "(T)he cultural context and impact of judi­
cial administration must be thoroughly understood by all involved 
in the system of bush justice" (Id:4). 
Court arraignments were to be conducted in Native languages 
and bilingual attorneys or para-professionals were to be 
recruited (Id:6). That an act was committed pursuant to Native 
-1-
custom was to be considered as a mitigating factor in sentencing 
(Id:6). 
The University of Alaska was requested to establish an insti­
tute to train legal personnel in both rural and urban areas in 
Native culture and languages (Id:3). The University, state 
administration and judicial council were to initiate programs of 
research concerning such areas as the character and processes of 
village law-making, judicial administration and law enforcement" 
( Id: 5) . 
This last recommendation is particularly important because it 
led to my invitation to join the University of Alaska. 
These reforms of bush justice were in turn to be implanted in 
an environment hostile to local innovation or dispersal of power 
to villages. 
The constitution established a centralized court system (with 
no pockets of local autonomy such as county courts); a Department 
of Public Safety; a Di vision of Corrections within the Depart­
ment of Heal th and Social Services; a Department of Law; and a 
state Public Defender Agency. Each of the latter agencies were 
headed by appointees of the governor. These state agencies had 
some limited competition from incorporated cities and organized 
boroughs. But in bush Alaska, it is fair to say that they had 
free reign over the local level and quality of service. 
State agency heads sat on the Governor's Commission for the 
Administration of Justice headed by Chief Justice Boney. State 
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law and order money was directed to state agencies not local com­
munities. 
Village Alaska had Native representation but no strong advo­
cate for federal dollars.2 
The era was marked by the conclusion of the Native land 
claims debate. The settlement resulted in a prolonged process of 
land selection and distribution of funds among regional cor­
porations in Alaska. Native legislators did not focus upon bush 
justice issues in village Alaska. Regionalization was the byword 
of Native political organization (Conn and Garber, 1981). 
With Boney's untimely death in 1972, the impetus for direc­
tion of the justice system and content passed back to the 
discrete departments charged with policing, prosecution, defense 
and corrections and their professional administration. Continu-
ance of meetings of the Governor's Commission was for little more 
than a mutual division of the federal spoils. 
Villages were to remain legal colonies, subject arbitrarily 
to either inadequate police assistance or, in other cases, gross 
overpolicing. Neither village autonomy nor professional service 
improved. The relationship between village and state law suf­
fered. 
For the researcher, then, an evaluation of his role in this 
process must include very serious professional soul searching. 
Did his emphasis upon cultural adaptation understate and conceal 
the political imperatives which dictated the allocation of 
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 resources throughout the period? Did "cultural difference" pro­
vide the excuse for justice decision makers to avoid hard deci-
sions within their own realm? Did some spurious allegiance to 
village autonomy and its local law provide a continuing justifi­
cation for inadequate state intervention to deal with violent 
crime? 
What is the bush justice system in Alaska? 
It is a constitutional scheme of rule making, law enforce­
ment, adjudication, defense and correctional activity which feeds 
through separate and highly centralized bureaucratic channels 
from urban Alaska to small towns. From small towns fledgling 
governmental services flow to networks of rural villages. These 
150 villages of 300 persons on the average are predominantly 
Eskimo or Indian. Village legal connections with the towns are 
formed in some instances by paraprofessional judges, police or 
ex-official bodies such as village councils who report some 
serious cases to state field operatives in towns. 3 More often 
connections are triggered by reports of serious crime and removal 
of offenders and victims to towns by the appropriate agencies. 
In Eskimo village society all law jobs and institutions have 
been designated by whites. Villagers, however, implemented and 
developed them. Thus although the "state legal system" and the 
"village legal system'' are both white creations from their incep­
tion, each has a differing ongoing creative core. No Eskimo per­
son in Alaska would suggest that village justice systems were 
constructed to handle all matters serious and unserious; they are 
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components of the state system whether the state system chooses 
to acknowledge it or not. 
Those with deepest involvement in matters of bush justice 
must be divided into three camps. 
The first camp is that of the legal professionals. They may 
be divided into policy makers at the top and field operatives at 
the bottom. At the top of the supreme court is the chief 
justice, a man deeply concerned with the ideology of due 
process. 4 He is particularly concerned with the image of his 
court. His lieutenant, the administrator of the state court 
system, is concerned with the heal th and welfare of his own 
growing bureaucracy and its competence as measured by the legis­
lature, by practicing attorneys and by high court judges. Their 
counterparts in the Department of Law are the attorney general 
and the chief prosecuting attorney. The chief public defender 
combines the ideological and administrative perspectives. 
Field operatives represent the agency in town locations which 
serve as service centers. A single corrections officer in the 
town of Bethel, for example, provides juvenile intake and dispo­
sition, probation, parole and, presentence reports for convicted 
felons for a region about the size of the state of Oregon, with 
57 villages and 29,000 persons. The town's public defender and 
assistant district attorney each have the same position within 
their own bureaucracy and the same village clientele. 
The field operatives have direct contact with villages and 
their justice systems, both official and extraofficial. Their 
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mandate is to keep their agency's service record clean, "to keep 
the lid on." Although they have usually very clear perspectives 
of bush justice, their propensity to blow the whistle on inade­
quate service and lack of sufficient funds from their agency or 
from others must be weighed against career considerations.5 They 
are not in a position to change the allocation of resources of 
their own agencies or of others. Discrete agencies are also not 
prepared to collaborate at the top though necessity may compel 
collaboration in the field. Thus in 1975 in Nome, it could be 
said that the justice system played basketball on Thursday 
nights. Each system agency views his service and village connec­
tions as separate from the other. Only the village views all 
contact from justice agencies as coming from a single source. 
The second camp is comprised of consumers. In 1974 and in 
1976 they have been given a chance to express their concerns to 
justice professionals through Bush Justice Conferences. More 
often, usually around election time, they have aired their 
complaints to visiting agency heads in what have been termed "dog 
and pony shows" (See Easely, 1973). 
Those members of this village constituency nominated as 
magistrates, village police, or correctional aides are set apart 
from field professionals because they do not enjoy limited pro­
fessional lines of communication which stretch from town to urban 
bureaucracies. Village magistrates and village police exist in a 
nether world, making loose connections between the power stuc­
tures of state justice and village justice. 
-6-
        
         
         
         
     
       
     
        
          
    
       
         
         
       
        
         
          
    
          
          
         
        
      
The researchers are in a third camp. They were called upon 
to study the relationships between the state and village justice 
processes. They also zeroed in on the relationships of Natives 
to one or both systems each from legal perspectives, historical 
perspectives, anthropological perspectives, but rarely from 
political perspectives. Over ten years they researched, tested 
and recommended solutions to policymaking professionals. 
In short, the work of researchers tended to concentrate 
around the delivery of services to villages and the interplay of 
village and state legal process. 
As with the paraprofessionals, researchers reported to both 
systems but had a power base in neither. 6 Outside of the justice 
bureacracies they operated somewhat out of control of all key 
participants but had access to any and all. 
The Early Years of The Relationship 
In Alaska village councils, locally elected bodies, have now 
had 6 0 years of experience in the business of dispute adjustment 
(See Conn and Hippler, 1973a) or 35 more than the state legal 
system. Teacher-missionaries introduced these institutions. 
Their intent appears to have been to use the councils to advance 
their own agenda: to suppress the manufacture of hootch, to seek 
out and punish sinners and to urge upon parents the discipline 
necessary to operate village schools in communities still geared 
to the rhythms of hunting and fishing. 
Councils over time cut loose from teachers and found a place 
within the larger web of white and Eskimo social control. 
-7-
In the Eskimo communities, representatives of leading fami-
lies formed a consensus within councils. Village councils fit 
within the process of community and state law. Councils back-
stopped and extended dispute adjustment. Their early style 
reflected the classic approaches of conflict avoidance - con-
ciliation, gossip, ostracism and counseling among Eskimos. But, 
as important, they were supported from the outset by white 
village residents, teacher-missionaries deputized under federal 
law, the board of elders in Presbyterian and Moravian com­
munities, occasional resident U.S. Commissioners and nonresident 
marshalls, Coast Guard cutters and even a distant court system 
(Milan, 1964 and Case, 1978). 
Councils were the last stop in a process of evolving inter­
personal customary law ways and the first step in a process of 
Western intervention that could result in referral to a police 
and court process outside of the village. 
Western legal intervention had made impossible (or at least 
more dangerous) killing or banishment as final steps in a custom-
ary legal process. However, to a certain extent it had replaced 
these ultimate steps with removal into its own legal process in a 
distant place at the request of village councils. 
Councils were most often an Eskimo institution of last resort 
but even within its processes of case adjustment were opportuni­
ties to admit one's guilt, ask forgiveness and be reintegrated 
into the community. Orientation and not punishment was the usual 
result of the process. Two or three appearances before a council 
-8-
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could be anticipated before it sought to draw in outside police 
authority. 
Intervention by marshall, Indian police, liquor suppression 
agents and later territorial police, while limited by geography 
and state resources, was sufficient in territorial days to rein-
force the council when it responded punitively. By reacting to 
incipient conflict or to the seeds of later conflict, councils 
avoided confrontation with either villagers or with agents of the 
official legal system (See Conn and Hippler, 1975). 
The Later Years 
A variety of factors destabilized the council as a mechanism 
for dispute adjustment in the years immediately following state­
hood (1959). In meetings with state officials, council presi­
dents learned that state officials would not support bans on 
liquor possession or manufacture (Conn, 1981a). "Village rules" 
were distributed by district attorneys, rules easily transferable 
into state violations. Two factors made this arrangement 
unworkable. First, promised supportive intervention by the 
troopers when councils requested it was not forthcoming. In the 
Bethel region alone, for example, in 1963 a single trooper pro­
vided service to 57 villages. 
Villages were informed that they were to handle matters on 
their own and notify the police only when violent felonies had 
occurred. Letters to police during the period demonstrate that 
detailed descriptions of repeated violence were often left 
unanswered. 
       
        
         
          
         
        
        
   
A survey conducted by researchers and troopers in 55 villages 
in 1977 revealed that on the average it took three days for the 
troopers to respond to a request for assistance (Angell, 1981a). 
The head of the Department of Public Safety, when confronted with 
this data, suggested that trooper involvement in the survey had 
caused village officials to minimize the actual length of time 
necessary to respond. He suggested that seven days was a more 
likely figure (Nix interview, 1977). 
Inadequate trooper response even after villagers have 
at tempted ( on the field operative' s instructions) to deal with 
less serious problems, destroyed the credibility of village law 
within its own realm. That credibility was, in part, state 
determined. 
Second, in the early 1970's drunken behavior in public or in 
private was decriminalized. Service centers such as Bethel 
became ready sources of wage opportunities and bootleg liquor. 
Youthful populations rose dramatically, partially as a result of 
improved health care, and populations shifted from villages more 
distant from towns to those within relatively close proximity to 
towns. 
Impact on Council Justice in the 1970's 
Councils as institutions have continued to play a central 
role in dispute processing in more than a 100 villages without 
magistrates. Yet to continue that activity councils were forced 
to become less "council-like," by earlier definitions, and more 
court-like by magistrate terms. 
-10-
Councils confronted a more persistent stream of conflicts of 
a magnitude and severity unlike the immediate past. 
With external punitive intervention less reliable, many coun­
cils shifted from bodies of reconciliation to bodies which 
directed fines and other sanctions at offenders. This shift from 
council-like to court-like approach was never completely success­
ful. Fines were not collectible. Official support for fining 
was verbal but never explicit. Young persons challenged council 
authority (See Conn, 1976). 
In the late 1960 's, the court system introduced appointed 
Native justices of the peace (called magistrates) into about 
30 Native villages. Where this occurred, villages councils 
deferred to this official authority and refused further com­
plaints (Conn and Hippler, 1973b). Yet because matters heard by 
councils were often pre-or sublegal in Western terms, because 
complainants did not wish to confront fellow villagers, and 
because village policing was unstable, transfer of authority did 
not induce a transfer of the legal activity. Most villages did 
not receive magistrates, and could not appoint them without court 
approval. 
Reports from police indicated that by the mid-1970 's eighty 
percent of their arrests still resulted in council and not court 
disposition. 7 In a 1977 survey of 55 villages a quarter of all 
matters processed as criminal law violations resulted in council 
or problem board disposition (Angell, 1979a). In other words, 
village police appended themselves to councils, as adjudicative 
-11-
bodies for minor offenses despite the fact that for the judicial 
system, councils were illegal institutions. 
The irony of the position of the village council by the early 
1970's should not be overlooked. As an official matter, the 
state legal system viewed village council process as an anachro­
nism, a fixture of law ways of a distant past. As an unofficial 
matter, field professionals armed with mandates from their 
superiors to carry out impossible tasks of representation, prose­
cution and law enforcement over distant villages were vocal in 
their support of what they perceived to be continuing examples of 
Eskimo justice. 
Yet this very encouragement of village justice demanded that 
the village system shift from a preventative process, capable of 
anticipating problems, to one that reacted very much like Western 
systems. The balance of outside intervention with inside delib-
eration was lost and village councils found their council process 
mutated out of its original form as it was forced to handle both 
parts of the process. 
When magistrates and village police were offered to villages 
through appointment and training, the issue was not best articu­
lated as a conflict between law systems, Western and non-Western. 
Rather, the issue was whether villagers could adequately address 
their present problems with new Western resources inferior to the 
working arrangement between formal law and village law of earlier 
days. The earlier arrangement worked in part because there were 
fewer problems. But it also worked because it contained support-
-12-
      
         
          
          
  
 
 
ive elements. It allowed legal levels, one consensual, another 
punitive, to interact. But more than this, by circumstance if 
not by political intent, it placed in Eskimo hands the authority 
to draw in external force. Put baldly, Western police did not 
intercede unless called. 
Yet under this new arrangement what appeared to be more de 
facto control of village affairs was less. 
Village Efforts 
The record shows persistent attempts by villagers to con­
struct their own system as a component of the state process. 
Villagers were told to turn back to "the old ways" and draw upon 
a village consensus for enforcement of village law. But the "old 
ways" were formed out of a coalition of white and Native 
authority. The "old way" did not contend with prepaid liquor 
orders by telephone, improved air and land transport and wage 
opportunities of a younger generation as demanding of their offi­
cial legal rights as other Alaskans. 
Villages requested assistance in the drafting of their own 
town statutes. They realized that some skilled professional 
advice was necessary in order to make the laws enforceable within 
the state system. 
When ordinances were sent to Juneau to an agency cons ti tu­
tionally obligated to help towns and villages, they were filed 
away without comment. 8 Villages were left in a legal never­
never land as troopers and state officials refused to apply 
-13-
         
    
         
      
       
        
         
         
        
  
       
         
         
          
          
        
 
       
         
          
village ordinances. Even village magistrates scorned village 
ordinances. 
What village justice systems have had to undertake has out-
stripped their capacity to deal with it pre-emptively. Problems 
have also overrun their capacity to deal with them in Western 
terms through policing, judging and jailing (See Angell, 1981a). 
Professional Perspectives 
The reality of a relationship between white legal agents 
representative of first military, then territorial, then state
authority to small villages has changed little, if at all, in 
more than a hundred years of contact (Conn, 1981b; Jennes, 1962; 
and Murton, 1965). What has changed are professional attitudes 
toward the relationship. 
Professional policymakers fail to understand village justice
as a component of their own justice system. They view village 
process as a separate reality from which they with lesser or 
greater capacity remove cases to be dealt with in the thorough­
going process that they know to be the "real" justice system, 
real justice being a process of adversary justice leading to 
state corrections. 
Professional operatives in towns understand the relevance of 
matters left to village justice. But, for them, these matters 
are simply problems happily left outside of the realm of their 
own professional caseload. "Progressive villages" or "villages 
which handle their own problems" are admired by town-based pro­
fessionals out of relief more than out of respect (Nix and 
-14-
Timbers interviews, 1973). Yet few would not concur that real 
justice as delivered would not be preferable if it could flood 
the villages. 
What professionals fail to perceive is that the interplay of 
state and village justice must be nurtured and adapted to sur-
vive. For villagers engagement of the systems is an historical 
fact. They have sought collaboration on terms reflective of the 
stronger aspects of the village justice process and those of the 
state. This implies shared control of the process. 
A working justice process has been the objective of the 
researchers and, they believe, the village. 
Yet does this global objective translate readily into com­
partmental ideological and administrative considerations of 
separate justice agencies? Can it be achieved if the idealized 
goal of planners is a fully articulated western justice system, 
capable of providing checks and balances, capable of providing 
due process and law enforcement typical of urban Alaska and urban 
America whether or not that goal is feasible or desirable? 
On what terms then could reforms of bush justice be made? 
Perspectives and interpretations of "improvement" vary as one 
isolates interested constituencies. Institutional perspectives 
and ideological perspectives guide professional judgment. 
The administrator of the court system is said to have 
referred to bush Alaska as a "can of worms." Implantation of a 
centralized judicial system in farflung town and village Alaska 
-15-
was problematic. Costs were high. Discovery of persons to fill 
positions was difficult. 
After the state constitution went into effect, the only offi­
cial judicial activity tolerated was through court personnel. 
Towns and villages without judges or magistrates could not offi­
cially appoint a judge or employ a council as court (Alaska State 
Constitution Art. 4 Sec 1, 1959). 
From an administrator's perspective allocation of judicial 
resources presented several problems: 
(1) dangers of autonomy borne from distance, lack of super­
vision and lack of indoctrination into Western legal perspective; 
(2) dangers of community influence on decisions made 
appropriate to resolution in terms of higher law; and 
(3) problems of management and supervision. 
Village magistrate activity displaced judicial activity if 
cases were heard by magistrates at defendant's request. It was 
not easily controlled. 
Magistrates were appointed by presiding superior court judges 
of judicial districts who jealously guarded their authority from 
intrusions by central administration. The court's magistrate 
supervisor lacked the power to hire and fire magistrates as did 
villages affectea.9 
Yet for all of these problems, bush magistrates (along with 
village police) comprised the lion's share of Native participa-
tion in the justice system. With a single exception, there are 
-16-
      
          
         
      
        
         
       
        
         
       
        
   
          
         
         
         
          
         
        
        
       
      
no Native judges or high administrators in any state justice 
bureaucracy (Alaska State Court System, 1981). 
The professional bureaucratic perspective emphasized super­
vision and control from higher levels to lower levels. It was 
difficult if not impossible to establish a system of justice in 
smaller Native communities satisfactory to this objective. 
The village perspective seemed to be a desire for control 
sufficient to deal with matters early and efficiently and to 
employ the professional justice system for support when 
necessary. It implied an autonomy which the centralized system 
rejected. 
Magistrates as Guardians of Due Process 
The court looks to its rural magistrates and Native court 
personnel for interpretation of Western meaning and values 
underlying instructions in Native languages in criminal and civil 
cases in rural Alaska. 
Yet the Native magistrate's actual capacity to try cases, to
advise clients and to reject overtures by police who might 
attempt to influence the justice process has been a matter of 
ongoing bureaucratic concern by the state court system in the 
past 10 years. Two advisory committees of lawyers headed by the 
chief justice mulled over the problems of that component (Second 
Magistrate Advisory Committee, 1979). Of primary concern was the 
challenge of authorizing persons with lay education to adjudicate 
cases in villages ill-equipped to sustain a judicial officer. 
Magistrates often lacked proper "facilities" (courtrooms and 
-17-
jails) and support from police regularly hired. 
The court's second mag is tra te advisory commit tee considered 
but then rejected ideas such as ( l) village magistrates would 
accept guilty pleas only, (2) that representation would be 
afforded in each village case; or ( 3) that magistrates' cases 
would be subjected to special ongoing review ( Second Magistrate 
Advisory Committee, 1978) because each would single out Native 
magistrates from non-Natives. 
Researchers pointed out that these lay judges were poorly 
trained in Western law and operated in isolation of Western 
justice systems. The court responded by upgrading its internal 
training program. Yet what they could not create through 
training was the direct experience of adjudication or court busi­
ness. 
From an administrative point of view, the 28-odd Native 
magistrates represented a needless drain on resources. The 
administrators argued that magistrates did not generate caseloads 
sufficient to be in every village or even in those villages pre­
viously selected for magistrate posts. People did not bring many 
complaints to magistrates. More importantly, most villages 
lacked facilities and all lacked attorneys. Thus they pressed 
for these prerequisites to placement of further magistrates. 
These criteria, it was suggested, would automatically bar place­
ment of mag is tra tes in most Native villages. The criteria were 
adopted by the committee as advisory and not mandatory 
(Committee, 1979:2). Unofficially accepted by the court adminis-
-18-
tration, their application since 1977 has resulted in no new 
magistrate posts in 112 Native villages without courts and in 
removal of five former posts since the committee issued its 
recommendations in 1979. 
To remove magistrates would leave what alternative? The 
court system has adamantly refused to recognize village council 
justice as an acceptable component of the process. It ignored a 
suggestion by researchers that councils act as lay assessors at 
the sentencing phase (Committee, 1978). 
What else could be suggested? The presiding judge of the 
Fairbanks court suggested that superior court judges, freed from 
urban court calendars, be assigned to regular village circuits. 
The circuit proposal was drawn from some limited understanding of 
the Canadian scheme of judicial service (See Morrow, 1974). Yet 
what committee members failed to understand, was that the "flying 
courts" of Canada dealt with a tiny percentage of cases left 
unhandled by justices of the peace in most settlements. Maps 
were drawn for the circuits and the idea found its way into the 
committee's final recommendations. There the plan disappeared 
with other recommendations, never to reappear on budgetary 
requests and never to be adopted by the state court system. 
The Canadian scheme did not speak to the issue which the 
court administrators so desired to define out of existence. On 
what terms would the state provide officially for the daily busi­
ness of law in small villages?l 0 
What the court has left in place by near-inaction is a 
-19-
limi tea allocation of magistrates in 28 of 140 villages, offi­
cially prepared to adjudicate cases, but in fact capable of and 
positioned only to turn arrests into guilty pleas. 
We researchers pointed out that magistrates displaced but did 
not actually replace village justice systems in Eskimo villages. 
We and Native organizations advocated and tested variant forms of 
dispute adjustment more reflective of small villages' needs and 
capacities ranging from mediation panels which might operate 
alongside a fining or adjudicative authority to councils or 
boards vested with the limited judicial authority which the 
magistrate possessed (See Case, 1977). 
As will be seen, the court system toyed with the concept of 
alternative forms of dispute adjustment, following the first bush 
justice conference, but then rejected it explicitly as a court 
function (Second Magistrates Advisory Committee, 1979:19). 
The Researchers' Perspective 
As researchers, we viewed ourselves as legal culture bro­
kers, prepared to make comprehensible, practical adjustments to 
both the village and state sides of the justice system. 
Our primary target was not a law process as measured by 
either ideological Western considerations or perceived Native law 
ways, but what we viewed to be an amalgam of both systems with 
adjustments necessary on both sides. 
Our focus was on the bottom of the system. Our goal was to 
improve the daily operation of law as reflected in perceived 
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village needs by developing methods for enhanced interaction 
between state and village processes as we had come to understand 
them. These methods were to be sustainable and acceptable to 
village consumers and justice policymakers and field operatives. 
We satisfied consumers and field operatives but not policymakers. 
The Problem Board Experiment 
The problem board experiment was grounded in careful study of 
the village council process both historical and contemporary 
throughout the 75 villages which comprise Eskimo Alaska. 
Assessment of village councils through study of their records and 
on the scene investigations led to our proposal to the court to 
test the proposition that a non-adversarial mediation panel could 
be established in villages. It would deal with matters then 
deemed inappropriate for either modern councils engaged in fining 
and jailing extralegally or magistrates (Conn and Hippler, 
1974a). In association with the Eskimo village of Emmonak we 
worked on the process. It was in fact a process of rediscovery 
since Emmonak had only recently delegated its dispute adjustment 
to village police and a magistrate. The state had provided these 
Western law figures with a portable "holding facility" (jail). 
The council had been able to drop its role as fining and 
jailing council. It had done this with some relief. 
Villagers recognized that an element of the earlier process 
was missing. The magistrate spoke of the family counseling she 
was called upon to undertake. She desired something like the old 
council to take up this activity. Problems with juveniles and 
-21-
other problems not clearly legal were mentioned. These were 
reflective of disputes heard by the village council. 
With the village we devised what we called conciliation 
boards ( drawing upon literature on village complaint boards in 
Ceylon). Villagers changed the name to problem boards. 
Villagers selected persons capable of problem solving, young and 
old, all Yupik speaking. They rejected the village priest when 
he volunteered. 
The researchers determined that voluntary conciliation under 
Alaska law could be used as an alternative to prosecution for 
misdemeanors in most cases. They emphasized that the board would 
not and could not fine or jail persons. This would be left up to 
the magistrate (Conn and Hippler, 1974b). 
The village developed the concept on its own. We had antici­
pated that matters would flow naturally from police to the 
magistrate and then be diverted by her to the problem board. In 
fact, what occurred was that matters moved directly and indepen­
dently to the board (Conn and Hippler, 1975). 
The problem board during its test phase dealt with matters 
which did not have clear legal remedies. These often involved 
situations involving alcohol which, if left uncounseled, were 
expected to result in violence. 
For example, the board counseled A who gave liquor to B, 
causing family chaos. It counseled C who teased D for using 
welfare money to play bingo. When E, a teacher aide, kicked F, a 
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student, it drew E and G (his parent) together to work out a 
compromise. It dealt with difficult family problems involving 
drinking, wife beating and child abuse. Juvenile matters were 
often considered. 
In the main, it anticipated violence. It had no power to 
fine or jail but could refer (and be referred) cases to and from 
the magistrate and the police. 
The Court Experiment with Problem Boards 
When the model became an experimental "program" within the 
court system, the court personnel in charge selected test vil­
lages with little concern for institutional relationships with 
councils or magistrates. 
While the problem board provided a mechanism for Native 
language speakers of all educational backgrounds to participate, 
only some villages were given to understand that one's skills at 
negotiation and conciliation and not youth and education were 
primary criteria. Others selected callow untrained youth for 
their boards. 
Court personnel did not feel comfortable with village 
experience at dispute adjustment. They held a workshop for 
problem board members at an urban resort and had members of the 
American Arbitration Association employ models of conciliation 
drawn from labor, prison and other urban settings to teach the 
Eskimos how to resolve disputes. 
Some test villages on their own grafted the board into their 
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processes with varying degrees of success. In village X near 
Bethel the board found a niche between the police and now-fining 
and jailing council (Conn, 1975b). Others saw the problem board 
as a weak substitute for either a magistrate or council. 
The court hired an attorney and anthropologist to evaluate 
the boards. Although the report was favorable to those boards 
which had been active, it stressed the limited number of matters 
heard (Marguez and Serdahely, 1977) and not problems avoided by 
board activity. 
The court's response was to end its association with the 
experiment. From its perspective, the boards had failed because 
they had not replaced either magistrates or extra-legal councils 
which fined or jailed when magistrates or outside assistance was 
not available. 
Although  the court disassociated itself from the project, a 
55 village survey two years later discovered three of the six 
problem boards established were still in operation (Angell, 
1979b). 
Paralegals 
Unlike the new, urban private law legal assistants who have 
evolved into a discrete professional category by taking upon 
themselves a variety of lawyer's tasks, we viewed rural parale­
gals located in towns and villages as capable of performing 
activities not then undertaken by either professionals or members 
of the village justice systems (Conn and Hippler, 1973b; Conn,
1974).
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The town paralegal' s work was to combine town and village 
justice. By moving out from the town to villages where crimes 
had occurred, the rural paralegal would investigate and report 
back to the professional those social facts ( as well as legal 
facts) overlooked by police. The police report had almost exclu­
sive bearing on legal decisions, such as bail, screening, 
charges, case organization and disposition. No longer would the 
professional have to depend on a police report or on conventional 
wisdom among field professionals to evaluate his case with an eye 
toward its impact on the real community affected. 
Our belief in village paralegals stemmed from several con­
siderations. First, we had recognized and reported on the depen­
dence of the rural justice process upon paralegals in a variety 
of village roles (Conn and Hippler, 1973b). Second, we were con­
vinced that the state legal process would not be introduced in 
village Alaska with any balanced concern for the integrity of 
either the Western process or understanding of the village law 
process, its strengths and its weaknesses. We perceived that, at 
best, state justice agencies would make village connections with 
a magistrate and a policeman. The screening function so essen­
tial to the integrity of both systems, carried on previously by 
the council, or left to a village policeman would be ignored or 
left to chance (Conn, 1975a). Professionalization would increase 
the tendency to intervene in village matters without concern for 
the propriety of that intervention on the single dispute or on 
the village law process. 
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Projects Accomplished and Their Bureaucratic Response 
In the years that followed we were able to test the proposi­
tion of the town based paralegal who worked for either a district 
attorney or public defender. A training-tutorial mechanism was 
established in both Nome and Bethel. 
Bush professionals, especially prosecutors, remarked that 
their professional collaboration with villages were enhanced. 
Trainees became serious members of the rural process. 
Yet in this instance as in many others where plans proposed 
or actually implemented at the town and village level received 
strong support from field professionals and village residents 
alike, reaction from urban bureaucracies was indifferent or 
hostile. 
LEAA representatives from Seattle questioned the use of 
$100,000 to underwrite the establishment of regional training 
programs whose end result was apparently four new paraprofes-
sionals. Their concern was sufficient to induce the state 
Criminal Justice Planning Agency in Juneau to ignore the project. 
The state attorney general had promised in writing to budget 
permanent positions for successful trainees. He at tempted to 
renege on his promise. Only the threat of newspaper exposure by 
the Bethel trainee saved his job. He was the only Native member 
of the rural Department of Law. 
A paralegal trainee with the Public Defender Agency also 
received high marks. Yet when the agency was in need of a second 
-26-
      
        
        
          
   
        
      
           
   
        
         
        
        
        
       
  
town attorney, she was encouraged to resign. She became a 
magistrate. 
The Alaska Division of Personnel unilaterally defined parale­
gal positions and established testing procedures. No provision 
was made for rural job requirements ( including language 
competence). The district attorney's paralegal failed the test. 
Village Paralegals 
The Alaska Legal Services Corporation established paralegal 
positions in Native villages on Alaska's North Slope. These 
trainees were educated to discover and investigate Western law 
problems and to channel cases into the state process and back 
into the village realm. 
Yet, when Alaska Federation of Natives funding from its 
federal CETA program disappeared, the village paralegals lost 
their positions, becoming more in a long line of Native men and
women "trained into oblivion." 
What do these experiments suggest about rural justice? It 
would appear that no experiment, however well attuned to village 
needs or cultural values, however well-received by villagers and 
however useful to field operatives and their limited resources 
will succeed without overcoming priorities both ideological and 
institutional which are more important than a rural justice 
system that works. 
The Present 
A 1977 study of 55 villages indicates that the carnage of 
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village Alaska is now truly impressive with murder, rape and 
violent crime rates two and three times the state average and 
many times those of the nation (Angell, 198la).11 
Village councils persevere in 25 percent of the sample sur­
veyed, skewed in fact to favor villages with magistrate service 
(Angell, 1981a). Villages depend upon outside police service or 
service of constables who act as liaisons to state troopers. 
Village control has been weakened and not strengthened. 
The court system has disavowed rural trials where facilities 
are inadequate to house personnel (Supreme Court rule 18-1). It 
has disavowed experiments with alternative forms of dispute reso­
lution. It has not acted upon plans proposed to it to attempt 
circuit riding. It trained and then forgot court interpreters 
(See Annual Report, Alaska State Court System, 1981).12 
When its developed in-house research organ discovered that 
Natives in urban courts receive longer prison terms for non­
violent offenses (Alaska Judicial Council, 1979), its judges 
attacked the problem by bringing up to the level of Natives, 
non-Native's sentences and not by encouraging correctional alter­
natives (Alaska Judicial Council, 1980).13 
Magistrates placed in earlier days exist as curious anachro­
nisms in rural villages, hearing fewer cases than councils did in 
their extra-legal state or even than the problem boards rejected 
by the court (Alaska State Court System, 1981). 
Paralegals trained to work with bush district attorneys and 
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public defenders have been forced to resign by their bureaucra­
cies even in the face of support by field personnel. The state 
personnel department has developed a test for such state posi­
tions which ignores language and job competence and emphasizes 
skills in math competence. 
The Department of Public Safety has received funds to place 
village police in villages along with detention systems, creating 
a partial Western system.14 
The Division of Corrections has provided no new correctional 
personnel to rural Alaska in ten years. Its dubious contribution 
has been to make old town jails ( in Bethel and Nome) over into 
modern town jails. 
Since police are more mobile than other components of the 
system, and more receptive to bush service, this means construc­
tion of law systems that could make of villages "closed 
institutions" with guards and cells (Goffman, 1961). 
We as researchers, fascinated both with cultural pluralism 
and committed to research leading to reform, must search our 
souls and consider whether or not the fruit of our labor has 
resulted in a legal process acceptable to any standard of justice 
or to none at all. Those of us who are lawyers first and anthro­
pologists second must consider whether we should steer away from 
research and lend our skills to law reform and political pressure 
and not to adaptation of the legal process and roles to fit small 
village situations. 
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Were researchers deceived or did they allow themselves to be 
deceived? Were they blind to overriding political considerations 
that made of "cultural relevance" a convenient excuse for 
bureaucracies to employ unless or until they were prepared to 
establish a partial copy of their system in village Alaska, a 
system unacceptable by either state or village standards? 
We who are infatuated with the opportunities for redefining 
a state law process to benefit an environment marked by cultural 
pluralism may find our work manipulated by those who underwrite 
it and apparently embrace it. From our global perspective should 
we not be impressed by the political imperatives that govern the 
entire process of bush justice? Chief among these is a battle 
for control of resources and populations which relinquishes none 
of that control to indigenous minorities on any terms without a 
fight. 
In Alaska, for example, it must be asked whether state 
authorities want village Alaska to survive. Is it not likely 
that state authorities would prefer an in-migration of Natives 
into its cities, that in 1991 Natives sell their shares of land 
claims awards and rest easily on their dividends in Anchorage 
condominiums? 
Destabilization of village life may in the end be desired 
over improved service. Despite the historical adaptation of 
Western law process to changing social and economic needs, pres­
ent policymakers and field operatives believe that the systems in 
which they function are a kind of evolutional by-product, natural 
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and appropriate to all places and persons within the American 
political domain. 
Though we may have scholars and historians who decry the phe­
nomenon, is it not the underlying message of Alaska legal devel­
opment that the consumers and their problems must fit the process 
and not the converse (See Friedman, 1973)? 
The force of legal assimilation is the dominant force and 
adaptations in the name of cultural imperatives are mere pauses 
(or worse than this, excuses) which conceal a longer term trend. 
As researchers, we in Alaska have tinkered with the system. 
We have listened and attempted to innovate within the system. 
What we did not accomplish was to draw Natives into the process 
as players, capable of negotiating change, possssing power and 
ultimately manipulating the system as co- or near- equals to 
other players. 
Manipulation and partial control of the system does not mean 
participation in bush conferences, seats on advisory committees 
or even membership in lower ranks of justice or police bureaucra-
cies. It means negotiating on legal process from positions of 
power. 
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Footnotes 
1 In the 566,000 square mile state of Alaska, half of the 
population live in towns and villages usually accessible only by 
river, sea or air. Within the latter rural population are 55,000 
Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts who reside in about 140 villages with 
populations from 25 to 700 persons and 300 persons on average. 
Another half dozen Native towns have populations from 1,500 to 
3,000 persons. "Bush justice" is the Alaskan term for legal pro­
cess which affects these predominantly Native villages and towns. 
2 Criminal Justice Planner Butch Schwartz reported that 
only 10.8 percent of Alaska's LEAA block grants and 11.1 of all 
LEAA funds directly benefited bush areas. Eighty percent of this 
amount went to construct five jails and to police programs. 
Schwartz, 1973:4. Angell (1981) reports that while small white 
communities are isolated for purposes of data collection in 
police statistics, village Alaska is included in a catchall cate­
gory. Nearly all white communities have a judicial officer. 
3 There are at least 112 small predominantly Native 
Alaskan cities (termed ''Native villages") without resident state 
judicial officers. John Angell (1981) reports that only half of 
about 55 villages surveyed had even a part time policeman. 
4 Said the State Supreme Court in Gregory v. State (1976), 
"We. . • recognize that the trial court is obligated to be cer­
tain tha t each citizen, when involved in a er iminal matter, is 
aware of the various rights guaranteed him by the Alaska and 
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United States Constitution." To this was footnoted the 
following: 
"The Anglo-American system of justice differs 
substantially from the traditional Indian, Eskimo and 
Aleut systems, which pre-dated Western cultures by 
hundreds of years. The cultural difficulties experi­
enced by many of the Alaska Natives as the contemporary 
Anglo-American ins ti tut ions reach out to the bush com­
munities require that the State legal system use extreme 
care in cases of this nature. Therefore, in those areas 
where a substantial portion of the populations consi ts 
of Native Alaskans, we urge the administrative office of 
the court system to develop bilingual explanations of 
basic rights for those who appear in criminal pro­
ceedings so that all citizens are clearly aware of their 
constitutional rights." Gregory at p. 380. 
5 Of course differing discoveries by researchers or jour-
nalists or complaints lodged in higher courts had differing 
impacts on state bureaucracies. 
For example, the Department of Public Safety actively sup­
ported research which discovered that violent crimes had overrun 
limi tea village and state resources. Its desire was to shift 
resources from urban areas (where they competed with urban 
pol ice) to rural sectors. Village police were taken under the 
wing of the Department of Public Safety (and even funded in 1981 
by them) as useful aides capable of dealing with minor drunken 
behavior without usurping primary police activities when major 
crime occurred. 
6 Annotated descriptions of twenty articles, books, and 
papers written by Conn on rural justice appear in Donna L. Kydd, 
Ed., Towards A Legal Education and Information Program for 
Natives, Native Law Center, University of Saskatchewan, 
Saskatoon, Canada, 1979. 
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7 "During . . (1972) the Village Policemen handled ten 
felony cases, 418 misdemeanors, and numerous noncriminal 
complaints. Seven of the felonies resulted in court action and 
128 of the misdemeanors resulted in court action. One hundred 
and fifty-one of the misdemeanors were handled by the Village 
Policemen without court or Council action." (Village Police 
Training Annual Report, 1972, p. 1.) 
As the project director described it in presenting other sta­
tistics for the year which showed court action on 63 cases and 
council action on 171, "[They] also illustrate a unique rela­
tionship of two branches of government within the Criminal 
Justice system. 11 (W. Nix, Subgrantee Professional Report, April 
11, 1972, p. 2. ) The report noted, 11 the council has levied 
$1,835.00 in fines, and 38 days of jail time. In almost every 
case, days of work for the village satisfied council sentences." 
8 In 1973, the Department of Law passed over protest pas-
sages of a book on formation of a second class city to be used by 
many villages. The book stated that councils could fine or jail 
persons for violation of local ordinances if the offender agreed 
to the punishment. See What's a Second Class City?, pp. 2-3, 
Cooperative Extension Service, University of Alaska in coopera­
tion with the Department of Community and Regional Affairs, State 
of Alaska, 1972. 
9 When, for example, it was discovered by the Alaska 
Federation of Natives that the Dillingham magistrate was a racist 
missionary who demanded that Natives swear off drink, who per-
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suaded them not to request an attorney and who refused to visit 
surrounding villages, the court could do nothing. His refusal to 
send in documentation of his cases also prompted no disciplinary 
action. 
Ironically when magistrate A retired and was replaced by 
B, a legal services attorney, B was fired by the presiding judge 
for living with a mate in an unmarried state. The supreme court 
upheld the presiding judge. 
10 Angell ( 1981) estimates that in villages he surveyed, 
legal professionals, other than troopers, appeared once a year or 
less. His conclusions seem to be reflected in an evaluation by 
village officials of state government agents. See Angell's chart 
reproduced as Appendix 1. 
11 See Appendix 2. 
12 Alaska Native adult males comprised 32.2 percent of the 
state jai 1 population in 1980. Source: Frank Sauser, State 
Division of Corrections. The Native population (average age 16) 
comprised 16 percent of the population. 
13 See Appendix 3. 
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Appendices (Accessible) 
Note, 23 Jan 2019: These appendices duplicate the content of the tables included in the original 
Appendix 1, Appendix 2, and Appendix 3, but have been formatted to make them accessible for 
users of screen readers. 
# % # % # % # % # % # %
Village Police 7 13.7 6 11.8 20 39.2 5 9.8 13 25.5 — —
AST 13 25.5 12 23.5 14 27.5 10 19.6 1 2.0 1 2.0
AF&W 7 13.7 6 11.8 17 33.3 13 25.5 4 7.8 4 7.8
Magistrates 14 27.5 7 13.7 8 15.7 3 5.9 14 27.5 5 9.8
Legal  Services 8 15.7 10 19.6 7 13.7 7 13.7 14 27.5 5 9.8
Prosecutor 3 5.9 11 21.6 9 17.6 5 9.8 11 21.6 12 23.5
Defense  Services 4 7.8 9 17.6 3 5.9 4 7.8 20 39.2 11 21.6
Probation/Parole 8 15.7 8 15.7 7 13.7 8 15.7 12 23.5 8 15.8
Local  Jail 2 3.9 3 5.9 11 21.6 9 17.9 22 43.1 4 7.8
Mental  Health 4 7.8 3 5.9 6 11.8 4 7.8 29 56.9 5 9.8
Medical  Services 15 29.4 11 21.6 17 33.3 4 7.8 2 3.9 2 3.9
State Jail 6 11.8 13 25.5 2 3.9 2 3.9 16 31.4 12 23.5
Educational Services 22 43.1 9 17.6 18 35.3 2 3.9 0 0.0 0 0.0
Fire 0 0 3 5.9 19 37.3 9 17.6 19 37.3 1 2.0
Welfare, Unempl. 10 19.6 16 31.4 13 25.5 6 11.8 2 3.9 4 7.8
Youth  Services 0 0 1 2.0 7 13.7 13 25.5 28 54.9 2 4.0
Appendix 1.
Source: Angell, John E. (1981)  Public Safety in the Justice System in Alaskan Native Villages, page 39.
PUBLIC  OFFICIALS  ASSESSMENTS  OF QUALITY OF JUSTICE  AND  SELECTED  PUBLIC SERVICES
N.R./DON'T 
KNOWNO SERVICEINADEQUATENEEDS IMPROV.OKGOOD
CATEGORY 
OF CRIME
ALASKA 
VILLAGES
ALASKA 
STATEWIDE
UNITED 
STATES
Homicide 28.4 10.9 8.8
Rape 99.2 50.3 26.4
Robbery 127.6 96.5 195.8
Aggravated Assault 326.0 286.5 228.6
Burglary 936.8 1,310.2 1,439.4
Vehicle Theft 446.5 3,272.6 2,921.3
Simple Assault 354.3 783.7 446.1
* Per 100,000 population in 1977.
Source: Angell, John E. (1981)  Public Safety in the Justice System in Alaskan 
Native Villages, page 27.
RATES*
Appendix 2.
COMPARISON OF ALASKA VILLAGES, ALASKA STATEWIDE, AND 
UNITED STATES CRIME RATES
White Black
American 
Indian Other Total
Burglary 368 12 98 67 545
Larceny 1,361 85 304 43 1,793
Drug Abuse 419 15 57 19 510
Liquor Laws 403 3 308 183 897
All Other Offenses 230 7 67 15 319
Curfew & Loitering 173 2 32 19 226
All Crimes 3,998 149 1,300 500 5,947
White Black
American 
Indian Other Total
Burglary 245.7 212.6 951.8 275.7 268.9
Larceny 908.9 1,506.5 2,952.6 176.9 943.8
Drug Abuse 279.8 265.8 553.6 78.2 268.4
Liquor Laws 269.1 53.1 2,991.4 753.2 472.2
All Other Offenses 153.6 12.4 650.7 61.7 167.9
Curfew & Loitering 115.5 35.4 310.8 78.2 118.9
All Crimes 2,670.1 1,640.9 12,626.3 2,057.8 3,130.5
Base Population 149,735 5,642 10,297 24,297 189,970
Source: Bayley, Bruce, et al (1980)   A Statistical Analysis of Discrimination in the Alaska Criminal 
Justice System.  Vancouver, Washington: Cascade Research Center.
1978 STATEWIDE ARREST RATE PER 100,000 INDIVIDUALS
Appendix 3.
STATEWIDE JUVENILE ARREST RATE PER 100,000 INDIVIDUALS
1978 STATEWIDE COUNT
